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1. INTRODUCTION

T

he Chinese room example is one of the most famous
and important counterarguments to the ‘strong AI’ thesis, based on Turing’s work, that any computer capable
of human-like dialogue understands English and has
thoughts much like our own. The systems reply has been levelled
against the Chinese room example as a way of defending this
claim. I propose that the systems reply fails because the heart of
its objection is based on a non-standard definition of
“understanding”, and does not consider the concept of consciousness. Furthermore, I will argue against the Extended Mind
thesis, as advocated by Clark and Chalmers, in which a redefinition of the boundaries of the mind is proposed. I will claim that
the extended mind thesis is very much like the systems reply. It
fails because it creates entirely new, non-standard concepts of
“mind” and “belief” that are used equivocally with the standard
definitions, does not factor in consciousness, and the criteria proposed for being part of the mind are no less arbitrary than those
that they are intended to replace.
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2. THE CHINESE ROOM AND THE SYSTEMS REPLY
Proponents of ‘strong AI’ make the claim, based on Turing’s groundbreaking arguments in Computing Machinery and Intelligence,1 that any computer capable of fooling a human into
thinking that they are conversing with another human in a written (or on screen) dialogue would have thoughts and understanding in the same way as we do. Thus, any understanding of
the nature of the computer program that achieves this gives us
understanding of the workings of the human mind. Furthermore,
the argument has been made (e.g. by Block2) that the necessary
requirement for thought, which both we, as humans, and the
computer that can pass the Turing test share, is the ability of formal symbol manipulation. In Mind, Brains and Programs, Searle3
creates a thought experiment in an attempt to show (contra
Shanck and Abelson4) that formal symbol manipulation is not a
sufficient condition for thought, and thus passing the Turing test
is not a guarantee of a computer’s understanding of language.
The thought experiment is very simple. Searle is in a room
and is passed cards with Chinese characters on them. He has a
look up table in a giant book, which tells him what to write as a
response to any given set of characters. He passes his answer
back, and the person on the other side, who only sees the replies
written on cards, believes he is having a legitimate conversation
with whomever is inside the room. Since Searle does not speak
Chinese, it is absurd to claim that, armed with his rulebook, he
suddenly understands the contents of the discussion he is a part
of. This is evidenced by the fact that, were the interlocutor to
pass through a message telling Searle that the room is on fire,
although he might pass a card back which says “thanks very
much, I’ll leave,” Searle would not actually do so – how could
he?
This experiment, then, can be thought of as analogous to a
computer, programmed with a look up table of English sentences
and rules for applying them. In both cases, there is indeed formal
symbol manipulation, and in both cases it is certainly possible
that a human may well be fooled into believing that they are part
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of an interesting conversation with a conspecific, but the fact remains that, in both cases, there is no understanding. Searle himself
is acting in exactly the same way as the CPU – simply following
instructions blindly. We may think of another analogy. If a heatseeking missile is programmed to lock on to a plane, a naïve observer might describe the missile’s behaviour as though it
“wants” to hit the target, but this talk of the missile as an intentional system is incorrect – the missile only has derived intentionality. In the same way, one might say that Searle in the Chinese
room only has derived understanding, since the only thing that actually adds to the understanding of Chinese in the room is the
rulebook, which was written by someone who actually does
speak the language.
The systems reply is an objection to Searle’s thought experiment in which the term ‘understanding’ is applied not to just
Searle, but to the system of the room, the book, and Searle as a
whole. The counterargument simply states that it is not the case
that Searle understands Chinese, but that the system as a whole
does. As Block puts it, “If the whole system understands Chinese, that should not lead us to expect the CPU to understand
Chinese.” Searle’s response is a good one. Imagine that Searle
simply internalises the rule- book by memorising the entire
thing. Remove the room. Let the entire process be in Searle’s
head. Searle still does not understand Chinese.
The major error in the systems reply is that the word
‘understanding’ is being used to mean something completely different to how we normally define it, and its redefinition is not
made explicit at the outset. Rather, the standard definition along
with the extended definition are used interchangeably. There are
many systems composed of multiple parts that function as a
whole in modern society. For example, the postal system is made
up of numerous complex pieces. Whereas we might say that the
postman understood where to deliver a letter, would we say,
“the Postal System understood that my letter needed to get to
Kentucky in two days”? Absolutely not – we do no speak of systems in this way. Understanding is limited, in everyday usage,
to, at the largest, the consciousness of an individual organism.
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Understanding, were it to occur in machines, would have to occur at the level of the machine’s motherboard, including its memory and CPU. To claim that a word like “under standing” can be
extended to objects that are connected in such a cursory manner
is contrary to both intuition and common usage.
It might be countered that we do speak in this way occasionally, for example, “the FBI knew the man way headed to
Venezuela” or “NASA announced that the launch will be postponed.” Although we do accept these kinds of sentences, they
are a matter of common parlance and not a matter of conceptualising the system as a whole. We could easily pinpoint the individual agents within the FBI who knew the fugitive’s whereabouts, and similarly a NASA statement is written by individual
people who have an understanding of the NASA mission as a
whole. These individuals would still have the same understanding absent the agencies for which they work, whereas the room,
book and Searle system requires both the rulebook and Searle
together, and even then they add up to create nothing more than
an illusion of understanding.
A second criticism is that the systems reply takes no account of consciousness. Searle and the rulebook cannot be
thought of in terms of a system because the rulebook is not conscious, not does it play an active or direct role in Searle’s consciousness. Thus, they cannot be thought of as a single system.
The rulebook is acting as a store of information with which
Searle can interact in order to produce the correct responses, but
there is an extra layer of translation and manipulation that only
Searle, and not the rulebook alone, can accomplish.
3. THE EXTENDED MIND
Clark and Chalmers’ thesis of “the Extended Mind”5 involves the question of exactly where the mind ends, and where
to draw the boundaries. This question is addressed by recourse
to a couple of examples. The first involves a Tetris-like set of scenarios. Let us imagine a situation where, in order to ascertain
whether a certain shape block will fit within a group of differ-
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ently shaped blocks (I assume we’ve all played Tetris), we can
either mentally imagine it, or use a button (which can do it
faster) to rotate it. Clearly, we imagine the first case as a mental
rotation, and in the second the rotation is clearly external. Now,
imagine a case in which the ability to perform the fast rotation is
implanted into our visual system, or, if that is too far a stretch,
that the rotation can be activated on screen by thinking about it.
(This is technology currently under development to assist the
disabled.6) This seems to be a bit of both. To try and solve the
problem, Clark & Chalmers propose the ‘parity principle’, which
states that, “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we
would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive
process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the
cognitive process.”7
The second example involves a man, Otto, who has memory loss, and thus must write everything in a notebook in order
to be able to function normally. Thus, in a case where he is asked
what he believes about a certain topic (e.g. where is MoMA) he
must consult his book before being able to answer the question.
Clark et al claim that this means the notebook is as much a store
of his beliefs as the internal part of the brain in which that information might otherwise be stored (the hippocampus?). Thus, we
should treat Otto storing his belief about MoMA in his book and
me storing my belief in my brain as exactly the same. The conclusion of these two examples, then, is that any physical system that
is recruited as part of a cognitive process is, by virtue of its participation in that process, part of the mind itself. Furthermore, an
agent’s beliefs, beings as they are part of cognitive processes, can
be stored in any physical location, outside or inside the brain.
The criteria supplied for judging whether or not something like a
notebook would be a candidate for a part of Otto’s mind are that
it is consulted often, the contents are always or for the most part
instantly affirmed, and the resource is easily consulted.
In support of this argument, an analogy can be drawn between adding extra memory to a computer and the notebook example. An external hard drive should not be viewed as any more
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or less part of the computer than an internal one, so why should
we favour our own internal grey matter over an external memory storage device such as a notebook? A bias towards seeing
anything external as automatically not part of the mind is not an
a priori reason to discount the view. Further, one might suggest
that an actual part of the brain could be transplanted outside the
body, kept in a vat, and connected via radio contact with the
brain. In this case, the external item is performing cognitive operations, and so what, apart from the fact that it is outside the
actual skull, separates this from being part of the mind? In this
case, the answer is nothing.
4. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTEREXAMPLES
TO THE EXTENDED MIND
To try to drive a wedge between the two examples above,
let us consider a further example – a watch. During the day, I
may consult my watch multiple times per hour, I will instantly
affirm that the time represented on it is correct, and it is incredibly easy to consult – a turn of the wrist is all that is required.
Thus, a watch satisfies all three of Clark and Chalmers’ criteria.
Would we consider the watch to be part of my mind? If an adherent to the externalist view would still claim that it is, then let
us push the example further. Imagine a time before wristwatches. People in earlier times consulted the sun in order to figure out the time of day. They could do this multiple times per
day, there would be no reason to doubt the position of the sun,
and what is easier to do than to simply look up. Thus, consulting
the sun for the time seems to satisfy the exact same criteria as using a wristwatch. By the same logic, then, it seems that the sun,
too, is part of our mind. Even a dogmatic believer in externalism
might want to reconsider this assertion. It seems as though the
criteria can easily lead us too far astray.
Clark et al’s assertion is that our intuitions are deceiving us
into using an arbitrary boundary, the skull, in order to define
where the mind ends. It is perfectly reasonable to insist that this
distinction is not as easy as it seems to be, and questions of exactly where we draw the line are valid. However, in place of this
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distinction, they substitute another equally arbitrary criterion – a
high degree of reliance, or “strong coupling”. The same question
of where we draw the line is equally, if not even more, relevant
in this case. After all, what constitutes as exactly enough reliance
– consulting the notebook once an hour, once a day, once a
week?
A further and deeper point is that our intuition seems to
strongly disallow the notebook, but allow the external brain segment. Why? I propose a different concept of “strong coupling”.
Rather than meaning degree of reliance, I would use “strong coupling” to describe the degree to which the actual cognitive process is ingrained and connected to the external device. The reason
why the notebook seems so implausible is twofold – firstly, it requires the beliefs to be translated into natural language, and then
into symbols by the person before being recorded, and then the
inverse when the information is accessed. This need for translation has a decoupling effect – the integration into the cognitive
process seems less and less direct as we add further stages of
translation and manipulation. Secondly, a notebook is something
that anyone can have access to – this is something we would not
claim for the information stored in our hippocampus. Something
that were connected in a more direct way seems more plausible
as a candidate for a part of the mind.
The watch and the sun example seem implausible because
they are being considered as part of the cognitive process in the
same way as the cerebral cortex may be considered part of the
cognitive process, but these are two very different things. Checking one’s watch, or the angle subtended by the sun involves consulting aspects of the external world in order to aid in belief and
desire formation. For example, knowing that the sun is directly
overhead can cause the beliefs that it is around noon, and thus
the desire to begin making lunch. However, the actual cognitive
processing itself consists in the interpretation of the sun’s angle
as a functional isomorphism for a particular hour. Like the Chinese room rulebook, the sun itself is not actually performing that
interpretive task, and thus it is not part of the mind. The distinction here is between the attributes of the physical world that, as
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humans, we are capable of interpreting as representing important information needed to form beliefs and desires, and the actual substantive matter that provides us with the ability to create
and manipulate these beliefs and desires in order to produce action.
To try to provide a counterexample that more closely parallels the general logic of the extended mind argument, let us
imagine exactly the inverse scenario. I wish to try and define exactly what is means to be ‘part of a computer’. Normally, we
would say that the computer ends where the boundaries of the
machine are, yet this may simply be a bias we have. Surely, if I
were experiencing a difficulty with a program in that it took up
too much space on the hard drive, I could conceivably print out
the information, and then, when necessary, input the code back
into the machine when the program required it. This would
mean that the computer’s memory is not only located inside the
machine, but also on the page. Why should we say, then, that the
paper is not part of the computer? After all, it requires the information on the page every single time it runs a specific program.
We should not bias this kind of storage space simply because it is
external, should we? Now, what if I simply memorised the code?
Then, wouldn’t I be part of the computer too? Again, our intuitions scream no, and for good reason. Neither the actual piece of
paper nor my mind are coupled, or connected, in the same way
as the actual circuits in the computer are. There is an extra decoupling stage, the printout, or the memorisation of the code,
which should automatically disqualify those things from being
part of the computer. In the same way, this kind of decoupling
should automatically disqualify a notebook as a candidate for
part of a mind.
5. ANALYSIS
The reason Clark & Chalmers seem to be able to argue with
some conviction and success is because the very term “mind” is
being used in two distinct ways. They are guilty, then, of the fallacy of equivocation. The first kind of “mind” is the kind we all
understand when we say the word – my mind is the seat of my
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consciousness, contained within my brain, or the parts of which
work together to perform all of the necessary cognitive processing, of language, perception, memory, etc. that I require to function. The second term, “mind” is used to denote the total of my
knowledge, experience and beliefs. This is not the same as the
first kind, because much of my knowledge exists in other places;
my experiences have been shared by others, and my beliefs, by
virtue of being expressed in language, can exist separate from me
(as represented on a page, for example). But to equate these two
things – the actual hardware necessary to be able to have beliefs
in the first place, and the beliefs themselves (articulated or otherwise), is to equate apples and oranges.
A further point is that the notion of ‘belief’ is also being
confounded. In one sense, I would call my mind the store of my
beliefs, but in a deep way, since it is the hardware that enables
me to have beliefs in the first place and manipulate them in a holistic manner. An essay that expresses my opinion on some matter is also a store of my beliefs, but in a very different sense. In
the case of the beliefs in my head, these may be very inarticulate
and vague – many people have beliefs that are logically inconsistent. But when we actually have to pronounce on a topic, we formulate our beliefs into natural language, and these become codified into assertions. In many cases, the pressure of having to pronounce a particular belief may cause us to say something we
later regret.8 Thus, the beliefs on the page and the beliefs in the
head are not one and the same. Secondly, we often speak of degrees of belief, a concept for which we seem to have an intuitive
grasp when talking about beliefs in our head, but for which there
is no easy expression in natural language. The example of the
location of a museum blurs these distinctions because it is too
simplistic – many beliefs are far more complex. A further point is
that expressing beliefs In a notebook prevents them from interacting in the holistic way that beliefs in the brain do? How can
they when they are fixed representations on a page. Thus, it is
not as easy to claim that the notebook is as legitimate a store of
beliefs as the mind.
The final point is, like the systems reply, the extended
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mind fails to take account of consciousness as a legitimate criterion for judging whether something is part of the mind. A common definition of the mind is the ‘seat of consciousness’. Thus,
anything that can be legitimately considered part of the mind
must either contribute to, or be necessary for, this consciousness.
That is why we can accept that the brain segment in the vat is
still part of the mind, despite being external to the skull, whereas
the notebook is not, because the notebook contains no elements
that we would call conscious, or in any way can contribute to
any part of the intrinsic consciousness of Otto, or anyone else.
6. CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS
After outlining the Chinese room, the systems reply and
the extended mind, parallels were drawn between the systems
reply and the extended mind thesis in order to articulate the
drawbacks of the extended mind approach. These included, in
particular, the failure to adequately factor in consciousness, and
the fallacy of equivocation in relation to the definition of
“understanding” and “mind”. With the use of counterexamples,
the inadequacies of the ‘strong coupling’ criteria were presented,
concluding with the judgement that they are as arbitrary, if not
more so, then the criteria they are intended to replace. Finally,
alternate criteria, such as a version of ‘strong coupling’ based on
the connection and integration into the cognitive process were
proposed.
In general, the extended mind may first appear as a radical
and exciting new argument for externalism. Its re-evaluation of
boundaries opens up questions of the social nature not only of
meaning but, more fundamentally, of the mind itself. Despite its
promise, however, the thesis leaves even the most uncritically
accepting with a somewhat sour taste in their mouths. After all,
where does extending our minds to a notebook or the Internet
really get us? What new insights does accepting this paradigm
enable us to discover? Putting our Popperian hats on for a minute, it seems like this kind of a hermeneutic, below the surface, is
devoid of real content. Almost anything, if interpreted in the
right way, can be considered part of the mind. As good scientists,
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we should always be rigorously testing our hypothesis, yet, like
the monumental failures of Freudian psychoanalysis or Marxist
historiography, the extended mind can be applied to almost anything and, more problematically, admits of no refutation.
POSTSCRIPT—THE MEANING OF MEANING, AND AN
ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNALISM
This discussion of the extended mind highlights an important confusion that plagues the externalist program, stemming
from the definition of “meaning”. Meaning is something that
cannot exist, like an abstract Platonic form, outside the mind. To
assert this is to commit a gross error. Every human mind is an
isolated universe, in a sense. The meanings that I attach to words
are my own and only my own, and they constitute what linguists
call my "idiolect"9 (the dialect that only I speak in quite the way I
do). Everybody has their own idiolect that we build by trial and
error from interactions with other humans using the powerful
linguistic inference tools with which we already come
equipped.10 What makes communication possible is not that
meaning is outside the head, but that the social nature of linguistic acquisition, together with shared common experiences (and
the assumption of an intersubjective world) guarantee much
overlap in the idiolects of different people who belong to what
we call the same "speech community."
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